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Abstract
Mobile data offloading is an emerging technology to avoid congestion in cellular networks and
improve the level of user satisfaction. In this paper, we develop a distributed market framework to price the
offloading service, and conduct a detailed analysis of the incentives for offloading service providers and
conflicts arising from the interactions of different participators. Specifically, we formulate a multi-leader
multi-follower Stackelberg game (MLMF-SG) to model the interactions between the offloading service
providers and the offloading service consumers in the considered market framework, and investigate the
cases where the offloading capacity of APs is unlimited and limited, respectively. For the case without
capacity limit, we decompose the followers’ game of the MLMF-SG (FG-MLMF-SG) into a number of
simple follower games (FGs), and prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of the FGs from
which the existence and uniqueness of the FG-MLMF-SG also follows. For the leaders’ game of the
MLMF-SG, we also prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. For the case with capacity
limit, by considering a symmetric strategy profile, we establish the existence and uniqueness of the
equilibrium of the corresponding MLMF-SG, and present a distributed algorithm that allows the leaders
to achieve the equilibrium. Finally, extensive numerical experiments demonstrate that the Stackelberg
equilibrium is very close to the corresponding social optimum for both considered cases.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
The data traffic in cellular networks has seen a tremendous growth over the past few years due to
the explosion of mobile devices, e.g. smart phones, tablets, laptops etc. The increasing data traffic in
cellular networks suggests that traffic from cellular networks should be offloaded so as to alleviate traffic
congestion and improve user satisfaction. Thus, mobile data offloading emerged as a promising approach
to utilize certain complementary transmission technologies to deliver data traffic originally transmitted
over cellular networks to the users. Recently, a large number of studies have investigated the potential
benefits of mobile data offloading and various innovative schemes have been proposed to better manage
data traffic including WiFi [1]–[5], femtocells [6]–[10], and opportunistic offloading [11], [12]. In fact,
these studies have shown that data offloading is a cost-effective and energy-prudent approach to resolve
network congestion and improve network capacity.
B. Motivation
However, the merit of mobile data offloading does not always guarantee that offloading is adopted by the
offloading service providers (OSPs) and offloading service consumers (OSCs), i.e., mobile data flows, in
practice. One of the most important reasons for not adopting mobile data offloading is the lack of economic
incentives, i.e., OSPs may be reluctant to make their resources available for offloading data traffic without
permission or appropriate economic reimbursement since offloading data traffic will consume their limited
wireless resources and reduce broadband connection capacity. Thus, it is of significant importance to
analyze the economic implications of mobile data offloading from the perspective of both OSPs and
OSCs. For ease of presentation, in this paper, we focus on WiFi offloading in which OSPs and OSCs
represent Access Points (APs) and cellular data flows, respectively.
From an economics point of view, there are many works considering the interaction between APs
and cellular data flows. For example, [13] studied delayed WiFi offloading by modeling the interactions
between APs and cellular data flows as a two-stage sequential Stackelberg game with one leader and
multiple followers. In [14], the authors investigated the economics of mobile data offloading through WiFi
or femtocells, and utilized a multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game (MLMF-SG) to achieve the
subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), and further compared the SPE with the corresponding outcomes in a
perfect competition market and in a monopoly market without price participation, respectively. In [15], the
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3authors considered the scenario where each of the mobile network operators (MNOs) can employ multiple
APs to offload its data traffic and each AP can concurrently serve traffic from different MNOs. The
proposed market scheme incurred minimum communication overhead and created non-negative revenue
for the market broker without requiring a priori information about MNOs and APs.
Motivated by [13]–[15], we consider a typical offloading scenario where a number of cellular data
flows offload their data traffic to a number of APs in their vicinity, e.g., hotspots near base stations. In
particular, we propose a pricing framework based on the concept of ‘paying for offloading’ to ensure
efficient use of the offloading APs. Under this framework each cellular data flow corresponding to a
mobile source-destination pair offers a payment to incentivize APs to participate in offloading, and then
the payment is shared in proportion to the amount of data offloaded to each AP. Hence, the utility of an
AP is its share of received payment minus its own offloading cost. For a cellular data flow, its utility is
defined as a generic concave function of the sum of the utilities from offloading on the APs minus the
cost paid to these offloading APs. We model the interaction of the APs and the cellular data flows as an
MLMF-SG, where the APs are the followers who respond to the payment offered by the cellular data
flows (i.e., each AP offloads a part of the data of some flows such that its utility is maximized, given
the payment offered by the flows and the actions of its competing peers); and the cellular data flows are
the leaders who set the payment to maximize their own utility in anticipation of the Nash equilibrium
(NE) response of the followers. Notwithstanding our interest in the mobile data offloading context, the
considered model is generic enough to be applied any other scenario where a set of ‘jobs’ compete for
the services of a pool of ‘workers’, such that the jobs set their payment rates, workers are free to choose
the job they will attempt, and payment from each job is eventually shared according to certain allocation
rules among all the workers that serve the job.
Unlike most pricing methods in the existing literature that involve only one type of selfish players [13]
or two types of selfish players without competition between them [14], [15], our framework features
two types of players, each of which competes not only with its peers but also with the players of the
other type. This property distinguishes our work from the scenario considered in [14], [15], where only
players of the same type can compete with each other although there exist two types of selfish players.
This difference cause the utility functions of players in this paper to be completely different from those
in [14], [15] as far as concavity is concerned. Concretely, with the strategy profile in [14], [15], the
utility functions of both followers and leaders are concave, which ensures that there exists an equilibrium
in the followers’ game and the leaders’ game, respectively. However, in our case, the payment from a
flow is shared proportionally among all APs according to the amount of data offloaded to each AP. As
February 27, 2018 DRAFT
4a consequence, an AP’s utility depends not only on its own strategy but also on the strategies of its
peers, which leads to complex interactions among the APs. Accordingly, the sharing of payment causes
the utility functions to be non-concave, which necessitates a completely new and original study of the
game’s equilibrium.
C. Contributions
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• We develop a distributed market pricing framework for mobile data flows to price the offloading
service.
• We formulate a Stackelberg game to model the interactions between offloading service providers
and offloading service consumers under the market framework, and investigate the cases where the
offloading capacity of APs is limited and unlimited, respectively. For both cases, we establish the
existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of the proposed Stackelberg game, obtain the Stackelberg
equilibrium in closed form when the offloading capacity of the APs is not limited, and further
propose a distributed pricing algorithm to ensure that the game converges to an equilibrium when
the offloading capacity of the APs is limited.
• We conduct a large number of simulations to verify our theoretical analysis on the proposed Stack-
elberg game for the two considered cases. As a noteworthy property of the developed framework,
simulation results demonstrate that the Stackelberg equilibrium is very close to the social optimum.
D. Related Work
To provide better service in cellular networks, a body of literature has proposed to exploit various
kinds of technologies to offload data traffic. These works adopt three different approaches for offloading.
The first approach is opportunistic offloading which utilizes opportunistic communication to offload
cellular traffic. For example, the authors of [11] considered the heterogeneities of mobile data and mobile
users in realistic disruption tolerant networks, and established a mathematical framework to study the
problem of multiple-type mobile data offloading. In [12], opportunistic communication was exploited to
facilitate information dissemination in the emerging mobile social networks and to reduce the amount of
mobile data traffic.
The second approach is femtocell offloading which has emerged as another primary option for macro-
cellular data offloading. In [6], the potential benefits and costs of deploying femtocells were surveyed.
In [7], the authors investigated the network operator’s profit gain from offering dual services through both
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5macrocells and femtocells. The authors of [8] considered the tradeoff between reducing the paging cost
in mobility management and registration signaling overhead, and proposed a delay registration algorithm
that postpones the registration and reduces signaling overhead while sustaining the traffic offloading
capability of the femtocell. In [9], optimal sleep/wake up schemes were studied for the base stations
of network-operated femtocells to offload part of its traffic to minimize the energy consumption of the
overall heterogeneous network while preserving quality of service (QoS). In [10], the authors studied the
economic aspects of femtocell services for the case of a monopoly market. The authors of [16] proposed
a dynamic pricing scheme based on market equilibrium and non-cooperative game such that the mobile
service providers can gain more revenue than with a fixed pricing scheme. In [17], the authors focused
on the inter-femtocell interference in three-dimension scenarios, and classified multiple femtocells into a
number of groups according to the amount of interference caused to others.
In this paper, we focus on another approach for mobile data offloading which exploits the freely
available WiFi networks, and is referred to as WiFi offloading. In [2], the authors first presented a
quantitative study for the performance of 3G mobile data offloading through WiFi networks, and then
proposed a distribution model-based simulator to investigate the average performance of offloading for a
given WiFi deployment condition. In [3], the authors studied the tradeoff between the amount of traffic
being offloaded and the user satisfaction, and provided an incentive framework based on reverse auction
to motivate users to leverage their delay tolerance for cellular traffic offloading. This performance gain
can be improved by delaying transmission [3] and predicting WiFi availability [3], [4]. A cost-effective
scheme integrating both WiFi and cellular radio access technologies was proposed to efficiently address
peak wireless data traffic and heterogeneous QoS requirements [5]. A subscribe-and-send architecture and
an opportunistic forwarding protocol were presented in [18] such that the users having subscribed contents
from the Content Service Provider (CSP) can obtain these contents from other users who can access these
contents through WiFi opportunistic peer-to-peer communications rather than directly downloading the
subscribed contents from the CSP. In [19], the authors proposed an enhanced WiFi offloading model
to bring mobile IP integration into the core network with Policy and Charging Control (PCC), and
developed a comprehensive analytical model to quantify the performance of data offloading in terms of
the amount of 3G resources saved by offloading and the deadline assurance for measuring the quality
of user experience with PCC support. In [20], the authors focused on the effect of inter-radio access
technology (RAT) offloading on the overall system performance, and developed a general and tractable
model that consisted of M different RATs, each deploying up to K different tiers of access points with
different parameters. In contrast to these existing works, this paper is the first to investigate the economic
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6behavior of WiFi offloading for two types of selfish players, which compete not only with the players of
the same type but also with players of the other type. This sets our work apart from the existing literature
in this field.
E. Organization of Paper
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The considered problem is formulated in Section II.
In Section III, we analyzes the Stackelberg equilibrium without offloading capacity limit, while in
Section IV we analyze the Stackelberg equilibrium with offloading capacity limit. Simulation results
are provided in Section V. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first provide the system model of WiFi offloading, and then introduce the pricing
market framework. Subsequently, we formulate the problem to a Stackelberg game.
A. System Model
We consider a set F of mobile data flows (or data traffics) in a cellular network where each flow
f transmits a number of data packets from the source Sf to the destination Df . A set R of potential
offloading APs (with |R| = R ≥ 2) in the vicinity of the flows, may help flow f to offload its data
packets to the destination via another transmission network, e.g. WiFi. In return, the APs may obtain a
certain reimbursement from flow f . The APs are assumed to be WiFis operating on different carriers, and
accordingly the APs’ signals do not mutually interfere with each other. Assume that time is slotted, and
there is a network-wide slot synchronization. We focus on how the packets of flow f should be priced
such that the APs have an incentive to offload data packets of flow f .
B. Pricing Framework
For a selfish AP i (i ∈ R), to incentivize offloading, it must receive some reimbursement that is
greater than its offloading cost. For this purpose, each flow f offers a payment of Cf to incentivize APs
to offload data traffic, where Cf is determined by the flow itself, i.e., Cf is the strategy of flow f . We
denote by rfi the amount of data offloaded by AP i for flow f . Hence, the utility of flow f ∈ F is
defined as the net payoff that f gets per slot:
Uf , uf
(∑
i∈R
log(1 + rfi )
)
− Cf , (1)
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7where the log(1+ rfi ) term1 reflects the diminishing utility of flow f from r
f
i . Function uf (·) represents
the total utility from the assistance of all APs. We assume uf (w) is continuously differentiable, strictly
increasing, and weakly concave in w, i.e., u′f (w) > 0 and u
′′
f (w) ≤ 0, with uf (0) = 0.
Next, we consider the utility of the APs. For flow f (f ∈ F), the payment of Cf is shared in accordance
with the level of cooperation, i.e., the amount of data offloaded by the APs that offload packets of flow f .
The vector ri = {rfi , f ∈ F} is the strategy of AP i where
∑
f∈F r
f
i ≤ B reflects the limited offloading
capacity B of AP i. We denote the cost (e.g. in terms of energy) for AP i to offload a packet of flow f
by efi . Thus, the expected payoff per slot for AP i is
Vi ,
∑
f∈F
V fi =
∑
f∈F
[
Cf
rfi∑
j∈R r
f
j
− efi r
f
i
]
, (2)
where V fi , Cf
r
f
i∑
j∈R r
f
j
− efi r
f
i .
The payoff function of AP i has the following property.
Lemma 1. Vi is not a concave function in rfj (j ∈ R, j 6= i).
Proof: It is easy to show ∂2Vi
∂2r
f
j
≥ 0, which means that Vi is not a concave function in rfj (j ∈ R, j 6= i).
C. Stackelberg Game
We model the offloading problem with pricing as a Stackelberg game which includes two roles
(leader and follower) and two stages. In the first stage, each flow f (as a leader) announces its re-
imbursement Cf , and the reimbursement from all flows are collected in a reimbursement vector C =
(C1, C2, · · · , C |F|). In the second stage, each offloading AP i (as a follower) in R choose its offloading
size ri = (r1i , r2i , · · · , r
|F|
i ) for different flows to maximize its own utility. Hence, the flows are the leaders
and the APs are the followers in this Stackelberg game. For convenience, let r = (r1, r2, · · · , r|R|) denote
the strategy profile of all APs where ri is the strategy profile of AP i. Let r−i denote the strategy profile
excluding ri and rf−i be the profile excluding AP i given f . Then, r = (ri, r−i) and ri = (r
f
i , r
f
−i).
1) Followers’ Game: Given r−i, each follower (AP i) chooses its strategy ri to maximize its utility
in response to the leaders’ strategies C , (Cf ,C−f ) = (C1, C2, · · · , C |F|). Thus, the objective of AP
1We adopt log(1 + rfi ) only for presentation purpose. This term can be replaced by other types of utility functions as long
as they reflect the diminishing utility of flow f in terms of rfi
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8i is to solve the following optimization problem:
r˜i(C) = argmax
ri
Vi(ri, r−i,C) (3)
s.t.
∑
f∈F
rfi ≤ B, ∀i ∈ R (4)
rfi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ R, ∀f ∈ F . (5)
Then, we have r˜(C) =
(
r˜1(C), · · · , r˜|R|(C)
)
. Note that the followers’ game itself can be considered
as a non-cooperative game [21].
2) Leaders’ game: Given C−f , each leader (flow f ) chooses its strategy Cf to maximize its utility
function Uf (·) anticipating that the followers will eventually respond with a collection of strategies that
constitute an NE according to (3). Thus, the leaders’ problem is
C˜f = argmax
Cf
Uf (C
f ,C−f , r˜(Cf ,C−f )). (6)
The solution of the Stackelberg game is characterized by a Stackelberg Nash Equilibrium (SNE), that
is a strategy profile from which no player has incentive to deviate unilaterally.
In the following sections, we will analyze the SNE for two different cases. In the first case, the capacity
of the APs is not limited, which corresponds to omitting constraint (4). In the second case, the capacity
of the APs is limited, which corresponds to keeping constraint (4).
III. STACKELBERG GAME EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS WITHOUT CAPACITY BOUND
In this section, we investigate the existence and uniqueness of an SNE for the considered Stackelberg
game if the capacity of the APs is not limited (corresponding to omitting the constraint (4)). Specifically,
we first show that the followers’ game of the multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game (FG-MLMF-
SG) can be decomposed into a series of followers’ games. Then, we show the existence and uniqueness
of an NE for the followers’ game by analyzing its best response strategy, and prove the existence of a
unique NE of the leaders’ game by utilizing the structural properties of its objective function.
A. Followers’ Game
Since the capacity of the APs is much larger than that of mobile devices, it is reasonable to assume
that there is no offloading capacity limit for the APs. Under this assumption, the following proposition
decomposes the complicated followers’ game defined in Section II into a number of simpler games.
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9Preposition 1. If the capacity of the APs is not limited, FG-MLMF-SG can be decomposed into |F|
followers’ games
(
FG(1), · · · , FG(|F|)
)
.
Proof: If the capacity of the APs is not limited, according to (2) and (3), FG-MLMF-SG, denoted by
r˜i(C) = argmaxri Vi(ri, r−i,C), can be decomposed into |F| followers games
(
FG(1), · · · , FG(|F|)
)
,
where FG(f), f ∈ F corresponds to the optimization problem r˜fi (Cf ) = argmaxrfi V
f
i (r
f
i , r
f
−i, C
f ).
Definition 1. Given Cf and rf−i, a strategy is the best response strategy of AP i for FG(f), denoted by
Γfi (r
f
−i), if it maximizes V fi (rfi , rf−i) over rfi ≥ 0.
From ∂V
f
i
∂r
f
i
= 0, we obtain r˜fi =
√
Cf
∑
j∈R\{i} r˜
f
j
e
f
i
−
∑
j∈R\{i} r˜
f
j . Therefore, the best response Γ
f
i (r
f
−i)
of follower i for flow f is
Γfi (r
f
−i) =


√
Cf
∑
j∈R\{i} r˜
f
j
e
f
i
−
∑
j∈R\{i} r˜
f
j , if e
f
i
∑
j∈R\{i} r˜
f
j ≤ C
f
0, otherwise.
(7)
The best responses of follower i for
(
FG(1), · · · , FG(|F|)
)
are collected in the best response vector
Γi(r−i) =
(
Γ1i (r
1
−i), · · · ,Γ
|F|
i (r
|F|
−i )
)
.
The following theorem states that the best response strategy leads to an NE of the FG-MLMF-SG.
Theorem 1. The strategy profile r˜ = (r˜1, r˜2, · · · , r˜|F|) is an NE of the FG-MLMF-SG, where r˜f =
(r˜f1 , r˜
f
2 , · · · , r˜
f
|R|
) is an NE of FG(f), where
1) the optimal sets of offloading APs, denoted by S = (S1,S2, · · · ,SF ), are computed by Algorithm 1;
2) r˜fi = (|Sf |−1)C
f
∑
j∈Sf
e
f
j
(
1− (|Sf |−1)e
f
i∑
j∈Sf
e
f
j
)
if i ∈ Sf ; r˜fi = 0 otherwise.
Algorithm 1 Computation of the optimal sets of offloading APs
1: for f ∈ F do
2: Sort APs according to their offloading costs: efσ1 ≤ e
f
σ2 ≤ · · · ≤ e
f
σR ;
3: Sf = {σ1, σ2}, i = 3;
4: while i ≤ R and efσi <
∑
j∈Sf
e
f
j
|Sf |−1
do
5: Sf = Sf ∪ {σi}, i = i+ 1;
6: end while
7: end for
8: return S = (S1,S2, · · · ,SF ).
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Proof: Please refer to Appendix A.
After proving the existence of an NE of the FG-MLMF-SG, we next prove the uniqueness of the NE.
Theorem 2. Given Cf , denote the strategy profile of an NE by rˆ = (rˆ1, rˆ2, · · · , rˆ|F|), where rˆf =
(rˆf1 , rˆ
f
2 , · · · , rˆ
f
|R|), and define Sˆf = {i ∈ R : rˆfi > 0}. Then, we have
1) rˆfi = (|Sˆf |−1)C
f
∑
j∈Sˆf
e
f
j
(
1− (|Sˆf |−1)e
f
i∑
j∈Sˆf
e
f
j
)
if i ∈ Sˆf ; rˆfi = 0 otherwise;
2) We sort {efj : j ∈ R} to efσ1 ≤ efσ2 ≤ · · · ≤ efσR , then Sˆf = {σ1, · · · , σi}, where σ1, · · · , σR is a
permutation of R given f , efσi+1 ≥
∑
i
j=1 e
f
σj
i−1 , and i ≥ 2.
These statements imply that the FG-MLMF-SG has a unique NE.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B.
Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 imply that there exists a unique NE in the FG-MLMF-SG.
B. Leaders’ Game
According to the above analysis, the flows, which are the leaders in the MLMF-SG, know that there
exists a unique NE for the APs for any given pricing vector C. Hence, each flow f can maximize its
benefit by setting Cf .
Given a specific flow f , feeding back into (1), we have
Uf = uf
(∑
i∈R
log(1 + rfi )
)
− Cf = uf
(∑
i∈Sf
log
(
1 + Cfki
))
− Cf ,
where ki = |Sf |−1∑
j∈Sf
e
f
j
(
1− (|Sf |−1)e
f
i∑
j∈Sf
e
f
j
)
.
Theorem 3. There exists a unique NE of the leaders’ game in the MLMF-SG.
Proof: Given a specific flow f , the second derivative of Uf with respect to Cf is
∂2Uf
∂2Cf
= u′′f
(∑
i∈S
log(1 + Cfki)
)(∑
i∈S
ki
1 + Cfki
)2
− u′f
(∑
i∈S
log(1 + Cfki)
)∑
i∈S
k2i
[1 + Cfki]2
< 0.
Thus, Uf = uf
(∑
i∈R log(1 + r
f
i )
)
− Cf is concave in Cf for Cf ∈ [0,∞). Since Uf |Cf=0 = 0
and Uf |Cf=∞ = −∞, Uf has a unique maximizer, denoted by C˜f = argmaxCf Uf . The C˜f , f ∈ F ,
compose the price vector C˜ which achieves the unique NE of the leaders’ game in the MLMF-SG.
Thus far, we have established the existence and uniqueness of the NE for the MLMF-SG when the
offloading capacity of the APs is not limited. However, due to hardware limitation and energy consumption
limits, in practice, constraints on the APs’ offloading capability are inevitable, which makes the interaction
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between APs and flows more complex. In the next section, we will further study the properties of the
NE of the MLMF-SG if a constraint on APs’ offloading capacity is present.
IV. STACKELBERG GAME EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS WITH CAPACITY BOUND
In the previous section, we have analyzed the NE of the considered MLMF-SG for the case when the
offloading capacity of the APs is not limited. Now, we consider the game if a capacity constraint on the
APs is present, and characterize the properties of the NE. First, we establish some structural properties
of some relevant quantities in the leaders’ game, and then we prove the existence and uniqueness of the
NE for the leaders’ game in the MLMF-SG. Finally, we present a distributed pricing algorithm for the
leaders’ game that converges to the unique equilibrium.
A. Followers’ Game
To make the analysis of the game tractable, we assume that the offloading cost of a specific flow
does not depend on the APs, that is, efi = ef for any AP i ∈ R given f . Note that this assumption is
reasonable as all APs are assumed to be located in the vicinity of flow f .
We commence our discussion of the properties of the equilibrium by considering the best response of
AP i using the strategy ri = (r1i , · · · , r
|F|
i ). The corresponding optimization problem from the perspective
of AP i can be stated as:
max
ri
Vi(ri, r−i) s.t.
∑
f∈F
rfi ≤ B, r
f
i ≥ 0, ∀f ∈ F . (8)
Thus, the corresponding Lagrangian function is given by:
L(ri, λi, ν) = Vi(ri, r−i)− λi ·
(∑
f∈F
rfi −B
)
+
∑
f∈F
νfi r
f
i . (9)
Since Vi is continuously differentiable in rfi , it follows that the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
corresponding to problem (9) are necessary for optimality. On the other hand, we note from (2) that, for
a fixed r−i, function Vi(ri, r−i) is concave in ri although it is not concave in r according to Lemma 1.
This implies that the KKT conditions are sufficient for optimality as well. Thus, we conclude that a
strategy profile is an equilibrium if and only if (i.i.f) there exist λi ≥ 0 and {νfi ≥ 0, f ∈ F} such that
the following conditions are satisfied:
(A1) :
∂Vi
∂rfi
= λi − ν
f
i , ∀f ∈ F
(A2) : λi ·
(∑
f
rfi −B
)
= 0
February 27, 2018 DRAFT
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(A3) : ν
f
i r
f
i = 0, ∀f ∈ F .
For ease of further discussion, we introduce the concept of strictly interior equilibrium which is formally
defined as follows:
Definition 2. We say that an equilibrium is a strictly interior equilibrium if the offloading size of any
AP i ∈ R for any flow f ∈ F is strictly positive, i.e., rfi > 0.
Now, we are ready to provide the following theorem, which guarantees the symmetry of a strictly
interior equilibrium.
Theorem 4. If a strictly interior equilibrium exists in the followers’ game, then it is symmetrical, i.e.,
rfi = r
f for any i ∈ R.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C.
Thus, in the following, we focus on symmetric strategy profiles, that is, all nodes use a symmetric
strategy, i.e., rfi = rf for any i ∈ R. To this end, we define the function
gf (rf ) ,
∂Vi
∂rfi
∣∣∣
r
f
j=r
f , ∀j∈R
= Cf
R− 1
R2rf
− ef = Cfhf (rf )− ef ,
where hf (rf ) , R−1
R2rf
.
Given a symmetric strategy profile, by Theorem 4, the KKT conditions for (9) can be refined to the
existence of λi ≥ 0 and {νfi = 0, f ∈ F} such that (A1)-(A3) are satisfied.
Now, we are ready to state the main result of this subsection.
Theorem 5. For any vector of flow price C, there exists a unique set of {ρf , f ∈ F} such that the
symmetric strategy profile {rfj = ρf , j ∈ R} is a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, there exist λ ≥ 0 and
{νf = 0, f ∈ F}, such that
(B1) : g
f (ρf ) = λ− νf , ∀f ∈ F
(B2) : λ
(∑
f∈F
ρf −B
)
= 0
(B3) : ν
fρf = 0, ∀f ∈ F .
Proof: Please refer to Appendix D.
Based on Theorem 5, we obtain that the solution of the following convex optimization problem is the
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NE of the followers’ game in the MLMF-SG.
max
ρ1···ρ|F|
∑
f∈F
(
Cf
R− 1
R2
log(ρf )− efρf
)
s.t.
∑
f∈F
ρf ≤ B, ρf > 0 ∀f ∈ F , (10)
which can be easily solved by software packages, such as Matlab.
B. Leaders’ Game
In this subsection, we study the effect of the payment rate Cf of a specific flow f ∈ F on the followers’
symmetric equilibrium when all other rates C−f remain fixed. To streamline the discussion, we express
the value of ρf of the equilibrium corresponding to a given Cf as a function ρf = Ψ(Cf ) (since we
focus only on ρf and are not interested in the strategy values for other flows). Also, we define the value
of λ that satisfies condition (B1)-(B3) in the equilibrium as a function λ = Λ(Cf ).
We begin by exploring these functions for extreme values of Cf . Clearly, for Cf = 0, the utility of
any AP cooperating with flow f is non-positive, implying ρf = Ψ(Cf = 0) = 0. However, from the
KKT conditions (B1)-(B3), we know ρf > 0, which implies Cf > 0. Thus, we assume that ρf must
be larger than a infinitesimal positive value, i.e., ρf = 0+. Define Cf = Ψ−1(ρf = 0+) , Cf and
λ = Λ(Cf = Cf ). Λ(Cf ) and Ψ(Cf ) have the following properties.
Lemma 2. Λ(Cf ) and Ψ(Cf ) have the following properties:
1) λ = Λ(Cf ) is continuous and non-decreasing in Cf ;
2) ρf = Ψ(Cf ) is continuous, and strictly increasing in Cf ∈ (0,∞);
3) ρf = Ψ(Cf ) is concave in Cf ∈ (0,∞);
Proof: Please refer to Appendix E.
Lemma 3. For a fixed C−f , the function Uf (Cf ,C−f ) is concave in Cf .
Proof: Assuming the followers respond with a symmetric equilibrium, the first order derivative of
utility function Uf with respect to Cf is given by
∂Uf
∂Cf
= u′f
(
R log(1 + ρf )
) R
1 + ρf
∂ρf
∂Cf
− 1, (11)
where ρf = Ψ(Cf ). Since uf (·) is concave by assumption, R log(1 + ρf ) is increasing and concave in
ρf , and ρf is concave in Cf by Lemma 2, it follows that ∂Uf
∂Cf
is non-decreasing in Cf , i.e., Uf is indeed
concave in Cf .
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Lemma 4. The best-response function Υf (C−f ) of flow f is bounded by 0 ≤ Υf (C−f ) ≤ uf
(
R log(1+
B)
)
.
Proof: Notice that Uf = uf
(
R log(1 + ρf )
)
− Cf . Obviously, for the best response, the utility is
nonnegative (utility 0 can always be obtained by Cf = 0). Hence, 0 ≤ Υf (C−f ) ≤ maxρf uf
(
R log(1+
ρf )
)
= uf
(
R log(1 +B)
)
.
Due to the concavity of Uf in Cf (Lemma 3), a unique solution is guaranteed; furthermore, we observe
that if uf is continuously differentiable, the best response function is continuous as well.
Theorem 6. If the followers always respond with their symmetrical NE, then an equilibrium of the
leaders’ game, i.e., an SNE of the overall system, exists and is unique.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix F.
Thus far, we have obtained the static characteristics of the leaders’ game, i.e., the existence and
uniqueness of the equilibrium. Next, we analyze the dynamic behavior of the leaders’ game, i.e., how
the game converges to the equilibrium from any initial strategy profile by best-response strategy updates.
Before delving into the convergence analysis, we discuss the monotonicity of the best response function
Υ(C−f ) of flow f .
Lemma 5. The best response Υ(C−f ) of flow f is monotonic and non-decreasing in Cf ′ for any
f ′ ∈ F \ {f}.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix G.
Now, we are ready to state the following theorem which characterizes the dynamic behavior of the
leaders’ game.
Theorem 7. Given some initial price vector C(0), if each flow f responds according to Algorithm 2,
where
(
ρ1(n), · · · , ρ|F|(n)
)
can be obtained by solving (10), that is, flow f ∈ F updates its strategy as
Cf (n+ 1) = Υ(C−f(n)), then limn→∞C(n) = C∗, where C∗ is the equilibrium of the leaders’ game.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix H.
Distributed Algorithm 2 computes the price Cf(n + 1) of flow f (f ∈ F) at n + 1, where the price
Cf (n+ 1) of flow f depends on
(
ρ1(n), · · · , ρ|F|(n)
)
rather than the price of other flows, i.e., Cf ′(n)
(f ′ 6= f ).
In this section, when the capacity of APs is limited, by considering a symmetric strategy profile, we
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Algorithm 2 Computing price for flow f
1: input: ρ1(n), · · · , ρ|F|(n);
2: if flow f ∈ F updates its strategy then
3: if ρf (n) +
∑
f ′ 6=f ρ
f ′(n) < B then
4: Cf (n+ 1) = u′f (R log(1 + ρ
f (n))) Rρ
f (n)
1+ρf (n) ;
5: else
6: λ =
[
u′f (R log(1+ρ
f (n)))
ρf (n)(1+ρf (n))
R−1
R
−
∑
f ′∈F
ef
′
ρf
′ (n)
]
1∑
f′∈F
1
ρf
′
(n)
;
7: Cf (n+ 1) = ρf (n)(λ+ ef ) R
2
R−1 for flow f ;
8: end if
9: end if
10: ouput: Cf (n+ 1).
have established the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of the corresponding MLMF-SG, and
further, based on the best response strategy, presented a distributed price algorithm that allows the flows
to computer their price independently.
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
In this section, we demonstrate some of the theoretical results derived in this paper, and gain further
insight into the behavior of the game for different scenarios via a numerical study. Our goal is to present
several scenarios indicative of the typical interactions among the players in the game. First, we consider
the case when the offloading capacity of the APs is not limited. Specifically, we evaluate the effect of the
offloading cost, heterogeneity of traffics, the number of APs etc, on the performance of the equilibrium.
In the second part of this section, we evaluate the performance of the game when the offloading capacity
of APs is limited.
A. Multiple Cellular Flows and Multiple APs with Offloading Capacity Limit
First, we introduce the price of anarchy (PoA). Denote the unique equilibrium of the proposed MLMF-
SG as (r∗ne,C∗ne), we know that (r∗ne,C∗ne) can be obtained by solving problem (10) and running
Algorithm 2, and the optimum system utility UNE at equilibrium is a function of (r∗ne,C∗ne), i.e.,
UNE =
[∑
f∈F Uf+
∑
i∈R Vi
]
(r,C)=(r∗ne,C
∗
ne)
. On the other hand, the social utility UOpt can be obtained
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by solving the following optimization problem,
max
ρ1···ρ|F|
{
Us ,
∑
f∈F
uf
(
R log(1 + ρf )
)
−
∑
f∈F
Refρf
}
s.t.
∑
f∈F
ρf ≤ B, ρf > 0, f ∈ F .
Denote ρ∗ = argmaxρ1···ρ|F|{Us}, and then, UOpt = Us
∣∣
ρ∗
. Therefore, PoA= UOpt
UNE
.
1) Convergence: We first consider the simplest scenario with two cellular traffic flows |F| = 2 and
two APs |R| = 2, which allows us to illustrate the interactions between flows and APs. Specifically, for
the cellular traffic flow f ∈ F , we adopt a linear utility function Uf = ωf
∑
i∈R log(1 + r
f
i )−C
f
. The
parameters are set as follows: offloading costs e1 = 0.1 and e2 = 0.3, weight coefficients w1 = 1 and
w2 = 2, and capacity limit B = 7 in Fig. 1(a) and B = 1 in Figs. 1(b)–(d), respectively. By solving
problem (10), we obtain ρ1 = 4 and ρ2 = 2.33, and further, C1 = 1.6 and C2 = 2.8 from Cf = efρf R2
R−1
according to Algorithm 2. Note that ρ1 + ρ2 = 6.33 < 7 implying that the condition ρ1 + ρ2 < B holds,
which is shown in Fig. 1(a). On the other hand, for B = 1, ρ1 + ρ2 = 1 must be satisfied at the NE,
which is illustrated in Figs. 1(b)–(d). Moreover, we observe from Figs. 1(b)–(d) that the price vector and
the strategy profile converge from different initial price vectors C(0) = (0.01, 0.01), C(0) = (5, 0.01),
and C(0) = (10, 10), respectively, which validates the proposed Algorithm 2.
2) Offloading Cost: Considering two cellular traffics |F| = 2, two APs |R| = 2 and two linear utility
functions with w1 = 2 and w2 = 1, respectively, we fix the offloading capacity to B = 2 and the
offloading cost of AP 1 to e1 = 0.5, and then show how the price vector and strategy profile change as
function of the offloading cost e2 of AP 2. From Fig. 2, we make the following observations.
(a) e2 ∈ (0.1, 0.25]. Assume ρ1 + ρ2 < B, then according to (23), we have ρf = wf
ef
R−1
R
− 1
(which is decreasing in ef ), and furthermore, ρ1|e1=0.5 = 1 and ρ2|e2=0.1 = 4, which implies that
ρ1|e1=0.5 + ρ
2|e2=0.1 = 5 > B = 2 contradicts the assumption ρ1 + ρ2 < B. Thus, ρ1 + ρ2 = B = 2
must be satisfied for e2 ∈ (0.1, 0.25], which is shown in Fig. 2;
(b) e2 ∈ (0.25, 0.5]. The condition ρ1 + ρ2 ≤ B = 2 is met with equality until e2 = 0.25. That is,
when e2 = 0.25, ρ2|e2=0.25 = 1 and ρ1|e1=0.5 + ρ2|e2=0.25 = 2 = B. Hence, if e2 > 0.25, then the
condition ρ1 + ρ2 ≤ B = 2 is no longer met with equality and ρ1 + ρ2 < B, which leads to ρ1 = 1 and
C1 = w1R
ρ1
1+ρ1 = 2 from Algorithm 2. Also, as e
2 increases, ρ2 = w2
e2
R−1
R
− 1 decreases, which can be
observed in Fig. 2;
(c) e2 ∈ (0.5, 1]. When e2 ≥ 0.5, ρ2 = w2
e2
R−1
R
− 1 = 12e2 − 1 ≤ 0, which implies that AP 2 does not
offload any data and accordingly, ρ2 = 0 and C2 = 0.
3) Heterogeneity of Data Traffic Flows: For |F| = 2, |R| = 2, w1 = 1, e1 = 0.1, e2 = 0.3, and
B = 1, Fig. 3 illustrates the relation between w2 and the price of anarchy (PoA), defined as the ratio
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Fig. 1. Convergence of price vector and policy vector to NE: e1 = 0.1, e2 = 0.3, w1 = 1, w2 = 2, and B = 7 in (a), and B = 1
in (b)–(d). For Figs. 1 (b)–(d), different initial price vectors C(0) = (0.01, 0.01), C(0) = (5, 0.01), and C(0) = (10, 10), are
used, respectively.
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Fig. 2. The impact of offloading cost on the price vector and strategy profile. w1 = 2, w2 = 1, B = 2, and e1 = 0.5.
between the optimal social utility UOpt and the system utility UNE achieved at NE. In particular, the
peak at w2 = 1 can be explained as follows. When w1 = w2, the two traffic flows are homogeneous.
In this case, the APs prefer to offload the traffic flow f = 1 because of its lower offloading cost (i.e.,
e1 = 0.1 < 0.3 = e2), and flow f = 2 cannot be treated equally, which leads to the peak of PoA at
w1 = w2. On the other hand, as the difference between w1 and w2 increases, corresponding to a larger
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Fig. 4. The impact of the number of APs on PoA. w1 = 2, w2 = 3, e1i = 0.1. and e2i = 0.2 for any i ∈ R.
heterogeneity of traffic flows, the NE strategy requires that the APs participate in pricing fully and offload
each traffic flow as much as possible, and thus, PoA → 1.
4) Number of APs: We consider two data traffic flows and multiple APs with a linear utility function
for each traffic flow, i.e., uf (
∑
i∈R log(1 + r
f
i )) = wf
∑
i∈R log(1 + r
f
i ) where w1 = 2 and w2 = 3.
Fig. 4 reveals that the PoA decreases with the number of APs. Since the APs have the same offloading
cost for each traffic flow, they equally and fully participate in the pricing process of each traffic flow,
and thus the equilibrium utility UNE becomes much closer to the social utility UOpt as the increasing
number of APs.
5) Large System: To demonstrate the asymptotic properties of the game in a large-scale symmetric
scenario, we consider 10 APs and 3 cellular traffic flows with e1 = 0.1, e2 = 0.3, e3 = 0.2, and wf = 1,
f ∈ F , for more complex utility functions, namely, power-law functions uf (x) = wfxb, 0 < b < 1, and
the logarithmic function uf (x) = wf log(1+x). Fig. 5 shows the PoA for the considered utility functions
when the number of APs increases from 2 to 10. Specifically, for the logarithmic utility function as well
as the linear function, the PoA decreases with increasing number of APs, while the PoA increases for the
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power-law utility functions. Moreover, the PoA increases as the value of b decreases (actually the linear
function can be seen as a power-law function with b = 1). Fig. 5 suggests that the proposed framework
can achieve an efficient equilibrium with at most 15% loss of system utility compared to the optimum
system utility when 3 ≤ R ≤ 10.
B. Multiple Cellular Flows and Multiple APs without Offloading Capacity Limit
In this subsection, for the case where the offloading capacity of the APs is not limited, we analyze
how the PoA is affected by different parameters, i.e., the offloading cost, heterogeneity of traffic, the
number of APs, and the number of traffic flows. First, we note that the optimum system utility, UNE ,
at equilibrium is a function of C∗ which is determined by the leaders’ utility functions. Specifically,
from ∂Uf
∂Cf
= u′f
(∑
i∈R log(1 + k
f
i C
f )
)∑
i∈R
k
f
i
1+kfi C
f
− 1 = 0, f ∈ F , we can obtain C∗, and further,
UNE =
[∑
f∈F uf
(∑
i∈R log(1 + k
f
i C
f )
)
−
∑
f∈F
∑
i∈R e
f
i k
f
i C
f
]
C=C∗
which shows that UNE is
determined by the leaders’ price vector. On the other hand, the social utility UOpt is the maximum
of Us =
∑
f∈F uf
(∑
i∈R log(1 + r
f
i )
)
−
∑
f∈F
∑
i∈R e
f
i r
f
i . Hence, from
∂Us
∂r
f
i
= u′f
(∑
i∈R log(1 +
rfi )
)∑
i∈R
1
1+rfi
− efi = 0, i ∈ R, f ∈ F , we have the optimum r∗ and further UOpt = Us
∣∣
r∗
which
shows that UOpt is determined by the offloading size of the followers.
1) Offloading Cost and Heterogeneity of Data Traffic Flows: In this scenario, we consider two sym-
metric APs and two traffic flows. In particular, the offloading cost of the APs for flow f is homogeneous,
i.e., e11 = e12 = 0.2 and e21 = e22 = e2. Meanwhile, the utility function of each flow is assumed to be a
linear function, i.e, uf (
∑
i∈R log(1 + r
f
i )) = wf
∑
i∈R log(1 + r
f
i ) where w1 = 1. Fig. 6 show how the
PoA is affected by the offloading cost and the heterogeneity of flows. We observe that as w2 increases,
corresponding to an increasing heterogeneity of flows, the PoA tends to decrease and approaches 1; on
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Fig. 6. The impact of the offloading cost and heterogeneity of traffic flows on PoA. w1 = 1, e11 = e12 = 0.2, and e21 = e22 = e2.
the other hand, as e2 increases from 0.2 to 0.8, PoA tends to increase. For example, when w2 = 2, the
APs are more reluctant to offload flow f = 2 for its larger offloading cost, and accordingly, the two
traffic flows are not treated equally. In this case, flow f = 2 cannot participate in the market pricing to
the same extent as its counterpart f = 1, which leads to an increase of the PoA.
2) Number of APs: We consider two data traffic flows and multiple APs with a linear utility function
for each traffic flow, i.e., uf (
∑
i∈R log(1+ r
f
i )) = wf
∑
i∈R log(1+ r
f
i ) where w1 = 2 and w2 = 3. We
consider two kinds of APs: homogeneous APs (with the same offloading cost for each traffic flow) and
heterogeneous APs (with different offloading costs for different traffic flows).
(a) Homogenous APs: Assume e1i = 0.1 and e2i = 0.2 for any i ∈ R. From Fig. 7, we observe that the
PoA decreases as the number of the APs increases, and approaches 1 for R ≥ 5. This can be explained
as follows. As each traffic flow has the same offloading cost, the APs equally and fully participate in the
pricing process, and as a consequence, the equilibrium utility UNE approaches the social utility UOpt as
the number of APs increases.
(b) Heterogenous APs: In this case, we assume e11 = 0.1, e21 = 0.2, and efj+1 = efj + 0.1 to generate
the offloading cost for each AP j ∈ R, which reflects the different QoS requirements of the APs. From
Fig. 7, we observe that PoA tends to increase as the number of APs increases, and ultimately converges
to a stable value. Because of the adopted generating rule for offloading cost, the offloading cost increases
as the number of the APs. Hence, when the number of APs exceeds a certain threshold, the APs with
larger offloading cost cannot obtain positive utility by offloading data traffic flow, and thus, do not offload
data because of their selfishness. This is the reason for the stability of the PoA when the number of APs
exceeds a certain threshold.
3) Number of Data Traffic Flows: We consider two APs and multiple data traffic flows with a linear
utility function for each traffic flow, i.e., uf (
∑
i∈R log(1+ r
f
i )) = wf
∑
i∈R log(1+ r
f
i ). Specifically, we
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Fig. 7. The impact of the number of APs on PoA. (Homogeneous) w1 = 2, w2 = 3, e1i = 0.1 and e2i = 0.2 for any i ∈ R.
(Heterogeneous) w1 = 2, w2 = 3, e11 = 0.1, e21 = 0.2, and efj+1 = efj + 0.1 j ∈ R.
consider homogeneous and heterogeneous data traffic flows, respectively.
(a) Homogeneous Data Traffic Flows: We use the rule, w1 = 2, w2 = 3, and wf+1 = wf , 2 ≤ f ≤ F ,
to generate a linear utility for each flow, and set the offloading cost to e11 = 0.1, e12 = 0.2 and e
f
1 =
0.3, ef2 = 0.4 for 2 ≤ f ≤ F . From Fig. 8, we observe that the PoA decreases with the number of
flows. This can be explained as follows. As the number of homogenous flows increases, a larger number
of flows compete in the market, which makes the UNE more efficient and close to the optimum social
utility.
(b) Heterogeneous Data Traffic Flows: We use the rule, w1 = 2, e11 = 0.1, and e12 = 0.2, wf+1 = wf+1,
and ef+1j = e
f
j + 0.1 to generate a linear utility for each flow and a offloading cost for each AP,
respectively. Fig. 8 shows that the PoA first decreases steeply and then increases slowly as the number of
flows increases. In the steep region (F ≤ 5), the effect of the heterogeneous utility functions dominates
the effect of the heterogenous offloading costs, which incentivizes the APs to offload data traffic flows,
and as a consequence, UNE comes closer to UOpt. In the flat region (F > 5), as the number of flows
increases, the advantage of the heterogeneous utility functions decreases while the negative effect of the
offloading cost becomes much stronger, i.e., the APs have less incentive to offload data traffic flows, and
consequently, the PoA begins to increase slowly.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a pricing framework for cellular networks to offload mobile data
traffic with the assistance of WiFi network. Specifically, the proposed framework can be utilized to
motivate offloading service providers to participate in mobile data offloading, which is a new paradigm
to alleviate cellular network congestion and to improve the level of user satisfaction as well. We have
modeled the pricing mechanism as a multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game in which the offloading
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service providers are the followers and the offloading service consumers are the leaders. Technically
speaking, we have analyzed the proposed Stackelberg game by distinguishing two different cases based
on the offloading capacity of the APs. For the case where the APs do not have an offloading capacity
limit, we have decomposed the followers’ game of the multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game
into a fixed number of followers’ games, and proved the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium,
and obtained an efficient algorithm to compute the equilibrium. For the case with offloading capacity
limit, by considering the symmetric strategy profile, we have established some structural results for the
equilibrium, and further proved the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game.
Consequently, we presented a distributed algorithm to compute the offloading price for each flow, and
proved its convergence to the unique equilibrium. Finally, extensive numerical experiments were provided
to demonstrate that the Stackelberg equilibrium is very close to the corresponding social optimum for
both considered cases.
There are some future research directions. One direction is the investigation of the case of asymmetric
strategy profiles, where each AP may have different offloading cost and offloading capacity. One of the
possible approaches is to analyze the followers’ game as a non-cooperative game [21], and we expect
that a unique equilibrium exists. Another promising direction for research is the investigation of other
allocation rules for reimbursement (rather than the proportional allocation rule considered in this paper)
such that the offloading service providers can be motivated to participate in mobile data offloading more
actively.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Based on Proposition 1, to prove r˜ = (r˜1, r˜2, · · · , r˜|F|) is an NE of the FG-MLMF-SG, we only need
to show that for a given flow f the strategy profile r˜f is an NE of the FG(f).
First, we prove that for FG(f) and any i /∈ Sf , r˜fi = 0 is the best response strategy given r˜
f
−i.
From Algorithm 1, we have efi ≥
∑
j∈Sf
e
f
j
|Sf |−1
for any i /∈ Sf at the NE point. Since i /∈ Sf , we have
efi
∑
j∈Sf\{i}
r˜fj = e
f
i
∑
j∈Sf
r˜fj =
e
f
i (|Sf |−1)∑
j∈Sf
e
f
j
Cf ≥ Cf , which implies that Γfi (r
f
−i) = 0 according to (7).
Next, we prove that for FG(f) and any σi ∈ Sf , r˜fσi is the best response strategy given r˜
f
−σi . Since
efσi <
∑
i
j=1 e
f
σj
i−1 (line 4 of Algorithm 1), we have
(|Sf | − 1)e
f
σi
= (i− 1)efσi + (|Sf | − i)e
f
σi
<
i∑
j=1
efσj +
|Sf |∑
j=i+1
efσj =
∑
j∈Sf
efj ,
where efσi ≤ e
f
σj for i+ 1 ≤ j ≤ |Sf |.
Furthermore,
efσi
∑
j∈R\{σi}
r˜fj = e
f
σi
∑
j∈Sf\{σi}
r˜fj =
(|Sf | − 1)
2(efσi)
2
[
∑
j∈Sf
efj ]
2
Cf < Cf .
According to (7), we have
Γfi (r
f
−σi) =
√√√√Cf∑j∈R\{σi} r˜fj
efσi
−
∑
j∈R\{σi}
r˜fj =
(|Sf | − 1)C
f∑
j∈Sf
efj
−
(|Sf | − 1)
2Cfefσi
[
∑
j∈Sf
efj ]
2
= r˜fσi .
Therefore, given f , r˜f is an NE of FG(f), and consequently, r˜ is an NE of the FG-MLMF-SG
according to Proposition 1.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Based on Proposition 1, to prove the uniqueness of the NE of FG-MLMF-SG, it is sufficient to show
the uniqueness of the NE of FG(f) for any f ∈ F . Let Sˆf = {i ∈ R : rˆfi > 0}.
1) rˆfi = (|Sˆf |−1)C
f
∑
j∈Sˆf
e
f
j
(
1− (|Sˆf |−1)e
f
i∑
j∈Sˆf
e
f
j
)
if i ∈ Sˆf ; otherwise rˆfi = 0. Considering that
∑
j∈R rˆ
f
j =
∑
j∈Sˆf
rˆfj ,
we obtain from ∂V
f
i
∂rfi
= 0,
−Cf rˆfi
[
∑
j∈Sˆf
rˆfj ]
2
+
Cf∑
j∈Sˆf
rˆfj
− efi = 0, i ∈ Sˆf . (12)
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Furthermore, we have |Sˆf |Cf−Cf =
(∑
j∈Sˆf
rˆfj
)(∑
j∈Sˆf
efj
)
by summing up the left hand side (LHS)
of (12) over all nodes in Sˆf . Therefore, we have∑
j∈Sˆf
rˆfj =
(|Sˆf | − 1)C
f∑
j∈Sˆf
efj
. (13)
Feeding (13) back into (12) and letting rˆfj = 0 for any j ∈ R \ Sˆ , we obtain
rˆfi =
(|Sˆf | − 1)C
f∑
j∈Sˆf
efj
(
1−
(|Sˆf | − 1)e
f
i∑
j∈Sˆf
efj
)
(14)
for every i ∈ Sˆ . This proves 1).
2) i ≥ 2. Assume i = 0, then any AP, e.g., AP j, can increase its utility from 0 to Cf2 by unilaterally
changing its offloading data size from 0 to Cf
2efj
, contradicting the NE assumption and demonstrating i ≥ 1.
Now, assume that i = 1. This means rˆfσ1 > 0 and rˆ
f
σk = 0 for all k ∈ R \ {1}. According to (2), the
current utility of AP σ1 for flow f is Cf − rˆfσ1e
f
σ1 . Hence, AP σ1 can increase its utility by unilaterally
changing the amount of data it offloads, contradicting the NE assumption. Therefore i ≥ 2.
On the other hand, considering the definition of Sˆf , we know that rˆfi > 0 for every i ∈ Sˆf . From (14),
rˆfi > 0 implies that
(|Sˆf |−1)e
f
i∑
j∈Sˆf
e
f
j
< 1. Therefore, we have efi <
∑
j∈Sˆf
e
f
j
|Sˆf |−1
for any i ∈ Sˆf , which implies that
max
i∈Sˆf
{efi } <
∑
j∈Sˆf
e
f
j
|Sˆf |−1
for any i ∈ Sˆf . That is, when APs are ordered such that efσ1 ≤ e
f
σ2 ≤ · · · ≤ e
f
σR ,
Sˆf is always composed of the APs with the least offloading cost. Assume Sˆf = {σ1, · · · , σk} where
efσk+1 <
∑
k
j=1 e
f
σj
k−1 , we have σk+1 /∈ Sˆf , and further rˆ
f
σk+1 = 0. Thus,
V fσk+1
∂rfσk+1
∣∣∣
r
f
σk+1
=rˆfσk+1
=
Cf∑
j∈Sˆf
rˆfj
− efσk+1 =
∑
j∈Sˆf
efj
k − 1
− efσk+1 > 0,
which implies that AP σk+1 can increase its utility by unilaterally increasing its offloading data size,
contradicting the NE assumption. Hence, Sˆf = {σ1, · · · , σi} and efσi+1 ≥
∑
i
j=1 e
f
σj
i−1 .
Statement 1), which gives the optimal amount of offloaded data, and Statement 2), which implies that
Sˆf has a threshold structure concerning the offloading cost, show the uniqueness of the NE of FG(f),
and furthermore, the uniqueness of the NE of FG-MLMF-SG is obtained based on Proposition 1.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
We prove this theorem by contradiction. Suppose that in a strictly interior equilibrium r, there exists
a flow f0 and APs i, j such that rf0i < r
f0
j . Consider the first order derivative
∂Vi
∂rfi
=
∑
k∈R r
f
k − r
f
i
[
∑
k∈R r
f
k ]
2
Cf − ef . (15)
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It follows that, for flow f0, we have
rf0i < r
f0
j =⇒
∑
k∈R r
f0
k − r
f0
i
[
∑
k∈R r
f0
k ]
2
Cf0 − ef0 =
∂Vi
∂rf0i
>
∂Vj
∂rf0j
=
∑
k∈R r
f0
k − r
f0
j
[
∑
k∈R r
f0
k ]
2
Cf0 − ef0 . (16)
On the other hand, since r is strictly interior, it follows from KKT condition (A3) that νfi = 0,∀i ∈
R, f ∈ F . Thus, combing (A1) and (16), we have
λi =
∂Vi
∂rf0i
>
∂Vj
∂rf0j
= λj ,
which therefore leads to rfi < r
f
j for any f ∈ F (not just f0), and, therefore,
∑
f r
f
i <
∑
f r
f
j ≤ B
which implies λi = 0 according to (A2). Obviously, this contradicts λi > λj ≥ 0. This completes the
proof of the theorem.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
Note that gf (ρf ) = ∂Vi
∂rfi
∣∣∣
r
f
j=ρ
f
for the symmetric strategy profile {ρf , f ∈ F}. Thus, conditions
(B1)-(B3) coincide with the KKT conditions (A1)-(A3) in this case. Accordingly, the set {ρf , f ∈ F}
corresponds to a symmetrical NE i.i.f it satisfies conditions (B1)-(B3).
It remains to be shown that there exists a unique combination of {ρf}, λ, and {νf} satisfying conditions
(B1)-(B3). To that end, we define the function W (x), where x = (x1, x2, · · · , x|F|), as: W (x) ,∑
f∈F
∫ xf
0 g
f (ξ)dξ. Consider the following optimization problem:
max
x
W (x) s.t.
∑
f∈F
xf ≤ B and xf ≥ 0, ∀f ∈ F .
Since W (x) is a sum of integrals of decreasing functions, it is continuously differential and concave,
and therefore, the above constrained optimization problem over a compact region must have a unique
solution, which is denoted by {ρf , f ∈ F}. This solution must satisfy the KKT conditions for problem (8),
which are precisely the conditions listed in (B1)-(B3).
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
(1) The continuity of λ with respect to Cf is immediate from conditions (B1)-(B3) and the continuity
of gf . To establish the monotonicity, suppose to the contrary that λa = Λ(Cf0a ) > Λ(Cf0b ) = λb for
some Cf0a < C
f0
b . Suppose that {ρ
f
a , f ∈ F} and {ρfb , f ∈ F} correspond to the equilibria at C
f
a and
Cfb , respectively. Then, λa > λb ≥ 0 implies that λa = Cfhf (ρ
f
a) − ef > Cfhf (ρ
f
b ) − e
f = λb for all
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f ∈ F \ {f0}. Since hf (ρ) is monotonically decreasing in ρ, we have ρfa < ρfb for all f ∈ F \ {f0}.
Thus, ρf0a = B −
∑
f∈F\{f0}
ρfa > B −
∑
f∈F\{f0}
ρfb ≥ ρ
f0
b , which implies, according to the decreasing
monotonicity of hf (ρ) and Cf0a < Cf0b , that C
f0
a hf0(ρ
f0
a ) − ef0 = λa < λb = C
f0
b h
f0(ρf0b ) − e
f0
, which
obviously contradicts λa > λb. Thus, we conclude that λ = Λ(Cf ) is continuous and non-decreasing in
Cf .
(2) The continuity of Ψ(Cf ) can be proved in a similar manner as that of λ = Λ(Cf ). We now prove
the monotonicity of Ψ(Cf ). Assume 0 < Cf0a < Cf0b , we consider the following two cases.
Case I. Λ(Cf0b ) = 0. Because of the monotonicity of Λ(Cf ), we have Λ(C
f
a ) = 0 as well. In the
equilibria corresponding to Cfa and Cfb , respectively, we have C
f
ahf (Ψ(C
f
a ))−ef = C
f
b h
f (Ψ(Cfb ))−e
f =
0, which implies Ψ(Cfa ) < Ψ(Cfb ) because of the monotonicity of hf (·).
Case II. Λ(Cf0b ) > 0. We prove the property by contradiction. Suppose to the contrary that ρ
f0
a =
Ψ(Cf0a ) < Ψ(C
f0
b ) = f
f0
b for some C
f0
a > C
f0
b . Suppose that {ρ
f
a , f ∈ F} and {ρfb , f ∈ F} correspond
to the equilibriums at Cfa and Cfb , respectively. According to the monotonicity of λ = Λ(Cf ), we have
λa > λb ≥ 0, which implies that λa = Cfhf (ρfa) − ef > Cfhf (ρfb ) − ef = λb for all f ∈ F \ {f0}.
Since hf (ρ) is monotonically decreasing in ρ, we have ρfa < ρfb for all f ∈ F \ {f0}. Thus, ρ
f0
a =
B −
∑
f∈F\{f0}
ρfa > B −
∑
f∈F\{f0}
ρfb ≥ ρ
f0
b , which contradicts ρ
f0
a < ρ
f0
b . Thus, we conclude that
ρf = Ψ(Cf) is continuous, and strictly increasing in Cf ∈ (0,∞).
(3) From the continuity of Ψ(Cf ), it follows that, for any 0 < ρf < B, there exist unique Cf =
Ψ−1(ρf ), λ, and {ρf ′ , f ′ 6= f} that construct a symmetric equilibrium together with ρf . Therefore, these
quantities can be regarded as functions of ρf , and we consider their derivatives with respect to ρf .
We rewrite condition (B1) for flow f as:
Cfhf (ρf )− ef = λ (17)
and, for any flow f ′ ∈ F \ {f},
Cf
′
hf
′
(ρf
′
)− ef
′
= λ. (18)
Taking the derivative of both sides in (17) and (18) with respect to ρf , respectively, we obtain
dCf
dρf
hf (ρf )− Cf
R− 1
R2
1
(ρf )2
=
dλ
dρf
(19)
− Cf
′R− 1
R2
1
(ρf ′)2
dρf
′
dρf
=
dλ
dρf
(20)
Now, we distinguish two subregions of λ. If ρf +
∑
f ′ 6=f ρ
f ′ < B, according to (B2), λ = 0 in the
vicinity of ρf . Thus, dλ
dρf
= 0 and gf (ρf ) = Cfhf (ρf )− ef = 0. Substituting these results into (19), we
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thus obtain
dCf
dρf
=
Cf
ρf
=
efR2
R− 1
, (21)
which is non-decreasing in ρf with ef ≥ 0.
Otherwise, for ρf +
∑
f ′ 6=f ρ
f ′ = B, taking the derivative of both sides with respect to ρf , then∑
f ′
dρf
′
dρf
= −1 in the vicinity of ρf , combined with (20), which implies
dλ
dρf
=
∑
f ′ 6=f
Cf
′R− 1
R2
1
(ρf ′)2
,
which can be fed back into (19) to yield
dCf
dρf
=Cf
R− 1
hf (ρf )R2
1
(ρf )2
+
1
hf (ρf )
∑
f ′ 6=f
Cf
′R− 1
R2
1
(ρf ′)2
=
(λ+ ef )
[hf (ρf )]2
R− 1
R2
1
(ρf )2
+
1
hf (ρf )
∑
f ′ 6=f
Cf
′R− 1
R2
1
(ρf ′)2
=(λ+ ef )
R2
R − 1
+ ρf
∑
f ′ 6=f
Cf
′
(ρf ′)2
, (22)
which is increasing in ρf , since is increasing in ρf (Lemma 2) and ρf ′ is decreasing in ρf .
Combing our findings that both (21) and (22) are non-decreasing in ρf , and noticing that the jump in
dCf
dρf
at the boundary between the two subregions (namely, the difference between (22) at λ = 0 and (21))
is positive, we conclude that Cf = Ψ−1(ρf ) is convex, and, therefore, Ψ(Cf ) is concave in the entire
range Cf > 0.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 6
Existence: Define the mapping Φ(C) = {Υf (C−f ), f ∈ F} as the collection of best-response functions
to the respective strategy vectors of other flows. Since each component of Φ(C) is continuous and bounded
(Lemma 4), the entire mapping is continuous and bounded. Therefore, it has a fixed point, which is an
equilibrium of the leaders’ game. This establishes the existence of the SNE.
Uniqueness: The uniqueness of the fixed point requires that, in an equilibrium, ∂Uf
∂Cf
= 0 must be
satisfied for any f ∈ F . We distinguish two cases in the following.
If ρf +
∑
f ′ 6=f ρ
f ′ < B, we have dCf
dρf
= C
f
ρf
= e
fR2
R−1 . Thus,
∂Uf
∂Cf
=u′f
(
R log(1 + ρf )
) R
1 + ρf
∂ρf
∂Cf
− 1
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=u′f
(
R log(1 + ρf )
)R− 1
R
1
ef (1 + ρf )
− 1 = 0,
that is to say,
ef (1 + ρf ) = u′f
(
R log(1 + ρf )
)R− 1
R
. (23)
Since the LHS of (23) is increasing in ρf while the RHS of (23) is decreasing in ρf , we can conclude
that (23) has one solution at most.
On the other hand, if ρf +
∑
f ′ 6=f ρ
f ′ = B, we have dCf
dρf
= (λ+ ef ) R
2
R−1 + ρ
f
∑
f ′ 6=f
Cf
′
(ρf′ )2
. Thus,
∂Uf
∂Cf
=u′f
(
R log(1 + ρf )
) R
1 + ρf
∂ρf
∂Cf
− 1 = 0,
that is to say,
(λ+ ef )
R2
R− 1
+ ρf
∑
f ′ 6=f
Cf
′
(ρf
′
)2
= u′f
(
R log(1 + ρf )
) R
1 + ρf
. (24)
Similarly, it is easily to see that the LHS of (24) is increasing in ρf while the RHS of (24) is decreasing
in ρf . Thus, we can conclude that (24) has one solution at most.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Given flow f , we consider two price vectors (Cfa ,C−fa ) and (Cfb ,C
−f
b ) such that C
f
a = Υ(C
−f
a ) and
Cfb = Υ(C
−f
b ), and the only difference between C
−f
a and C−fb is that one component Cf
′
, f ′ 6= f , is
changed between Cf
′
a and Cf
′
b , where C
f ′
a < C
f ′
b . The lemma then states that C
f
a ≤ C
f
b .
We prove the lemma by contradiction. Suppose that Cfa > Cfb when C
f ′
a < C
f ′
b . If C
f
b = uf
(
R log(1+
B)
)
, then the lemma holds trivially since Cfb is already an upper bound for possible values of Cf .
Therefore, we assume Cfb < uf
(
R log(1 + B)
)
, i.e., Cfb is the solution of the equation
∂Uf
∂Cf
= 0
at (Cfb ,C
−f
b ), and further define λb and ρ
f
b as the respective values of the corresponding followers’
equilibrium. Similarly, we assume that Cfa is the solution of ∂Uf∂Cf = 0 at (C
f
a ,C
−f
a ), and define λa and
ρfa as the respective values of the corresponding followers’ equilibrium.
Next, consider the followers’ equilibrium for the price vector (Cfb ,C
−f
a ), and denote the respective
values by λba and ρfba. For flow f ′, because of the increasing monotonicity of Λ(Cf
′
) from Lemma 2,
we conclude λba < λb since Cf
′
a < C
f ′
b . Consequently, for flow f , according to condition (B1), we have
Cfb h
f (ρfba) − e
f = λba < λb = C
f
b h
f (ρfb ) − e
f
, which implies ρfba > ρ
f
b as h
f (ρ) is monotonically
decreasing.
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Considering the two equilibria for the price vectors (Cfa ,C−fa ) and (Cfb ,C
−f
a ), respectively, we have
ρfa > ρ
f
ba since C
f
a > C
f
b because of the monotonicity of Ψ(Cf ).
Since each of the terms on the RHS of (11) is decreasing in ρf and Uf is concave in Cf , ∂Uf∂Cf is
decreasing in ρf and Cf , respectively. Then, for ρfb < ρ
f
ba < ρ
f
a and Cfb < C
f
a , we have
0 =
∂Uf
∂Cf
∣∣∣
ρ
f
b ,C
f
b
>
∂Uf
∂Cf
∣∣∣
ρ
f
ab,C
f
b
>
∂Uf
∂Cf
∣∣∣
ρ
f
a,C
f
b ,
>
∂Uf
∂Cf
∣∣∣
ρ
f
a,C
f
a
= 0,
which implies a contradiction. This completes the proof of the lemma.
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF THEOREM 7
First, consider an arbitrary sequence of update steps commencing from an initial vector C(0) =
(δ, δ, · · · , δ) where δ → 0+, and denote by C(n) the resulting sequence of flow price vector after n
updates. Obviously, for any flow f , the first time the flow updates its strategy will be a non-decreasing
update. In light of Lemma 5, it follows by induction that all updates must be non-decreasing, i.e., C(n)
is a non-decreasing sequence. Since C(n) is bounded as well (Lemma 4), it follows that it must converge
to a limit. Due to the continuity of the best response function Φ(Cf), this limit must be its (unique)
fixed point C∗.
In a similar manner, consider a sequence of best-response updates C(n) from an initial vector C(0) =
{η1, · · · , ηF } where ηf = uf
(
R log(1 + B)
)
(i.e., the upper bounds of the respective flows’ best
responses). By the same token, Lemma 5 implies that all the updates in the sequence must be non-
increasing, and the sequence must therefore converge to C∗.
Finally, consider an arbitrary initial vector of flow prices commencing from an arbitrary initial vector
of flow prices C(0). Without loss of generality, assume that all the prices are within the bounds set by
Lemma 4 (otherwise, consider instead the sequence only after every flow has had at least one opportunity
to update its strategy). Then, it follows that C(n) ≤ C(n) ≤ C(n) provided that for every n the update
step is performed by the same flow in all three sequences. Since, as established above, C(n) and C(n)
converge to C∗, it follows that the same is true for C(n) as well.
February 27, 2018 DRAFT
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
1.15
Iterations
Pr
ic
e 
of
 A
na
rc
hy
 
 
USNE/Uopt
0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.3
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
e2: offloading cost of flow 2
 
 
C1
C2
C3
ρ1
ρ2
ρ3
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
w2
Pr
ic
e 
of
 A
na
rc
hy
 
 
UOpt/UNE
